



**Swedish Certification Body for IT Security**

# Certification Report - KYOCERA TASKalfa 358ci

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## 1 Executive Summary

The TOE is the hardware and the firmware of the following multifunction printer (MFP) models with hard disk and with FAX:

KYOCERA TASKalfa 358ci

Copystar CS 358ci

Triumph-Adler/UTAX 352ci

with the following firmware:

System firmware: 2V4\_S0IS.C01.011

FAX firmware: 3R2\_5100.003.012

In the evaluated configuration, the optional hard disk and the optional fax board is installed and included in the scope of the TOE.

The TOE provides copying, scanning, printing, faxing and boxing.

Delivery is done by means of a courier trusted by KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc. Installation and initial setup is done by a representative KYOCERA or the approved reseller.

The ST claims demonstrable conformance to the Protection Profile (PP):

IEEE Std 2600.2 2009; "2600.2 PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment B" v 1.0 including the PRT, SCN, CPY, FAX, DSR, and SMI packages. (in accordance with NIAP CCEVS Policy Letter #20)

The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB, in their premises in Bromma and Sundbyberg, Sweden and to some extent in the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan, and was completed on the 18th of May 2020.

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), version 3.1 revision 5, and Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM), version 3.1 revision 5.

Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.

The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive versions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security Target (ST) and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level EAL 2 augmented by ALC\_FLR.2.

The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target (ST) and the Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by Combitech AB.

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The certification results only apply to the versions of the product indicated in the certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate is either expressed or implied.

## 2 Identification

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| Certification Identification                 |   |
|--|---|
| Certification ID                             | CSEC 2019009  |
| Name and version of the certified IT product | The multifunction printers:<br>Kyocera TASKalfa 358ci,<br>Copystar CS 358ci,<br>Triumph-Adler/UTAX 352ci<br>with Hard Disk and FAX System.<br>System firmware: 2V4_S0IS.C01.011<br>FAX firmware: 3R2_5100.003.012 |
| Security Target Identification               | TASKalfa 358ci Series with Hard Disk and FAX<br>System Security Target  |
| EAL  | EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2   |
| Sponsor                                      | KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.   |
| Developer                                    | KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.   |
| ITSEF  | Combitech AB  |
| Common Criteria version                      | 3.1 release 5   |
| CEM version                                  | 3.1 release 5   |
| QMS version                                  | 1.23.2  |
| Scheme Notes Release                         | 14.0  |
| Recognition Scope                            | CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA   |
| Certification date                           | 2020-06-03  |

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## 3 Security Policy

TOE provides the following security services:

- User Management
- Data Access Control
- Job Authorization
- HDD Encryption
- Overwrite-Erase
- Audit Log
- Security Management
- Self-Test
- Network Protection

### 3.1 User Management

A function that identifies and authenticates users so that only authorized users can use the TOE. When using the TOE from the Operation Panel and Client PCs, a user will be required to enter his/her login user name and login user password for identification and authentication. The User Management Function includes a User Account Lockout Function, which prohibits the users access for a certain period of time if the number of identification and authentication attempts consecutively result in failure, a function, which protects feedback on input of login user password when performing identification and authentication and a function, which automatically logouts in case no operation has been done for a certain period of time.

### 3.2 Data Access Control

A function that restricts access to protected assets so that only authorized users can access to the protected assets inside the TOE.

The following types of Access Control Functions are available.

- Access Control Function to control access to image data
- Access Control Function to control access to job data

### 3.3 Job Authorization

A function that restricts usage of the function so that only authorized persons can use basic functions of the TOE .

The following types of Job Authorization are available.

- Copy Job (Copy Function)
- Print Job (Print Function)
- Send Job (Scan to Send Function)
- FAX Send Job (FAX Function)
- FAX Reception Job (FAX Function)
- Storing Job (Box Function)
- Network Job (Network Protection Function)

### **3.4 HDD Encryption**

A function that encrypts information assets stored in the HDD in order to prevent leakage of data stored in the HDD inside the TOE.

### **3.5 Overwrite-Erase**

A function that does not only logically delete the management information of the image data, but also entirely overwrites and erases the actual data area so that it disables re-usage of the data where image data that was created on the HDD or the Flash Memory during usage of the basic functions of the TOE.

### **3.6 Audit Log**

A function that records and stores the audit logs of user operations and security-relevant events on the HDD. This function provides the audit trails of TOE use and security-relevant events. Stored audit logs can be accessed only by a device administrator. The stored audit logs will be sent by email to the destination set by the device administrator.

### **3.7 Security Management**

A function that sets security functions of the TOE. This function can be used only by authorized users. This function can be utilized from an Operation Panel and a Client PC. Operations from a Client PC use a web browser.

### **3.8 Self-Test**

A function that verifies the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data to detect unauthorized alteration of the executable code of the TOE security functions.

### **3.9 Network Protection**

A function that protects communication paths to prevent leaking and altering of data by eavesdropping of data in transition over the internal network connected to TOE.

This function verifies the propriety of the destination to connect to and protects targeted information assets by encryption, when using a Scan to Send Function, a Print Function, a Box Function and a BOX Function from a Client PC (web browser), or a Security Management Function from a Client PC (web browser). However, usage of a Print Function directly connected to a MFP is exception.

This function also provides a feature to prevent forwarding of information from an external interface to an internal network through TOE without permission.

## 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

### 4.1 Assumptions

The Security Target [ST] makes four assumptions on the usage and the operational environment of the TOE.

#### A.ACCESS.MANAGED

The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.

#### A.USER.TRAINING

TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.

#### A.ADMIN.TRAINING

Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.

#### A.ADMIN.TRUST

Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.

### 4.2 Clarification of Scope

The Security Target contains six threats, which have been considered during the evaluation.

#### T.DOC.DIS

User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons

#### T.DOC.ALT

User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

#### T.FUNC.ALT

User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

#### T.PROT.ALT

TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

#### T.CONF.DIS

TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons

#### T.CONF.ALT

TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

The Security Target contains five Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have been considered during the evaluation.

#### P.USER.AUTHORIZATION

To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.

#### P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION

To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.

#### P.AUDIT.LOGGING



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To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel.

P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT

To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.

P.HDD.ENCRYPTION

To improve the confidentiality of the documents, User Data and TSF Data stored in HDD will be encrypted by the TOE.

## 5 Architectural Information




Figure 1, Physical configuration of the TOE

The TOE consists of an Operation Panel, a Scanner Unit, a Printer Unit, a Main Board, a FAX Board, HDD and SSD hardware, and firmwares.

The Operation Panel is the hardware that displays status and results upon receipt of input by the TOE user. The Scanner Unit and the Printer Unit are the hardware that input document into MFP and output as printed material.

A Main Board is the circuit board to control entire TOE. A system firmware is installed on a SSD, which is positioned on the Main Board. The Main Board has a Network Interface and a Local Interface (USB Port).

The ASIC that is also on the Main Board includes a Security Chip, which shares installation of some of the security functions.

The Security Chip realizes security arithmetic processing for HDD encryption function and HDD Overwrite-Erase function.

A FAX control firmware that controls FAX communication is installed on the PROM, which is positioned on the FAX Board. Additionally, a FAX Board has a network control unit as an interface.

## 6 Documentation

For proper configuration into the evaluated configuration, the following guidance documents are available:

Notice

FAX System 10(X) Installation Guide

TASKalfa 508ci / TASKalfa 408ci / TASKalfa 358ci First Steps Quick Guide

TASKalfa 508ci / TASKalfa 408ci / TASKalfa 358ci Operation Guide

TASKalfa 358ci / TASKalfa 408ci / TASKalfa 508ci Safety Guide

FAX System 10(X) Operation Guide

Data Encryption/Overwrite Operation Guide

Command Center RX User Guide

TASKalfa 508ci / TASKalfa 408ci / TASKalfa 358ci Printer Driver User Guide

KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide

## **7 IT Product Testing**

### **7.1 Developer Testing**

The developer performed extensive manual tests on the following printer model:

Triumph Adler 352ci with

System Firmware 2V4\_S0IS.C01.011

FAX Firmware 3R2\_5100.003.012

Since the TSF and its execution environment are the same in the models in the 358ci family (which includes 352ci), this covers all of the TOE models.

The developer's testing covered the security functional behaviour of all TSFIs and most SFRs. Some gaps in the SFR coverage were identified and covered by evaluator independent testing. All test results were as expected.

The testing was performed in the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan.

### **7.2 Evaluator Testing**

The evaluator performed the tests on the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan, using the same test environment as the developer.

The evaluator verified a sample of developer tests and performed independent testing adding to the test coverage. All test results were as expected.

### **7.3 Penetration Testing**

The evaluators penetration tested the TOE using the same test environment as for the independent testing, in Osaka, Japan. The following types of penetration testing were performed:

- Port scans, using NMAP
- Vulnerability scan including web application vulnerability scan, using Nessus
- JPG fuzzing, using Peach fuzzer

All penetration testing had negative outcome, i.e. no vulnerabilities were found.

## 8 Evaluated Configuration

In the TOE operational environment, the following non-TOE hardware, and software is expected:

Client PC with KX printer driver, Kyocera TWAIN driver, and web browser  
Mail server connected via IPSec (IKE 1)  
FTP server connected via IPSec (IKE 1)

In the evaluated configuration:

- the optional hard disk and the optional faxboard are installed and are included in the scope of the TOE.
- local authentication should be selected – LDAP authentication servers should not be used
- maintenance interfaces shall not be accessible
- expanding functionality by installing Java applications is not allowed

## 9 Results of the Evaluation

The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.

The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].

The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.

The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the following table:

| Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family Name | Short name (including component identifier for assurance families) | Verdict |
|--|--|---------|
| Security Target Evaluation                   | ASE  | PASS    |
| ST Introduction                              | ASE_INT.1  | PASS    |
| Conformance claims                           | ASE_CCL.1  | PASS    |
| Security Problem Definition                  | ASE_SPD.1  | PASS    |
| Security objectives                          | ASE_OBJ.2  | PASS    |
| Extended components definition               | ASE_ECD.1  | PASS    |
| Derived security requirements                | ASE_REQ.2  | PASS    |
| TOE summary specification                    | ASE_TSS.1  | PASS    |
| Life-cycle support                           | ALC  | PASS    |
| Use of a CM system                           | ALC_CMC.2  | PASS    |
| Parts of the TOE CM Coverage                 | ALC_CMS.2  | PASS    |
| Delivery procedures                          | ALC_DEL.1  | PASS    |
| Flaw reporting procedures                    | ALC_FLR.2  | PASS    |
| Development                                  | ADV  | PASS    |
| Security architecture description            | ADV_ARC.1  | PASS    |
| Security-enforcing functional specification  | ADV_FSP.2  | PASS    |
| Basic design                                 | ADV_TDS.1  | PASS    |
| Guidance documents                           | AGD  | PASS    |
| Operational user guidance                    | AGD_OPE.1  | PASS    |
| Preparative procedures                       | AGD_PRE.1  | PASS    |
| Tests  | ATE  | PASS    |
| Evidence of coverage                         | ATE_COV.1  | PASS    |
| Functional testing                           | ATE_FUN.1  | PASS    |
| Independent testing - sample                 | ATE_IND.2  | PASS    |
| Vulnerability Assessment                     | AVA  | PASS    |
| Vulnerability analysis                       | AVA_VAN.2  | PASS    |

## **10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations**

None.

## 11 Glossary

|       |   |
|-------|---|
| CEM   | Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, document describing the methodology used in Common Criteria evaluations |
| CM    | Configuration Management  |
| EAL   | Evaluation Assurance Level  |
| HDD   | Hard Disk Drive   |
| IPSec | Internet Protocol Security  |
| ISO   | International Organization for Standardization  |
| IT    | Information Technology  |
| ITSEF | IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to operate within an evaluation and certification scheme              |
| LAN   | Local Area Network  |
| MFP   | Multi-Function Printer  |
| NCU   | Network Control Unit  |
| OSP   | Organizational Security Policy  |
| PP    | Protection Profile  |
| SMTP  | Simple Mail Transport Protocol  |
| SSD   | Solid State Disk  |
| ST    | Security Target, document containing security requirements and specifications, used as the basis of a TOE evaluation            |
| TLS   | Transport Layer Security  |
| TOE   | Target of Evaluation  |
| TSF   | TOE Security Functionality  |
| TSFI  | TSF Interface   |



## 12 Bibliography

- ST102 TASKalfa 358ci Series with Hard Disk and FAX System Security Target, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 1.02, 2020-05-18, 19FMV3558-34
- QG FIRST STEPS QUICK GUIDE, TASKalfa 508ci TASKalfa 408ci TASKalfa 358ci, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 302V55602001, July 2019, 19FMV3558-34
- IG-FAX FAX System 10(X) Installation Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 303R25673001, April 2019, 19FMV3558-34
- OG OPERATION GUIDE, TASKalfa 508ci, TASKalfa 408ci, TASKalfa 358ci, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version 2WHKDEN001, October 2019, 19FMV3558-34
- OG-FAX FAX System 10(X) Operation Guide TASKalfa 508ci TASKalfa 408ci TASKalfa 358ci, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document Version 3R22WHKDEN001, October 2019, 19FMV3558-34
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- CCRX User Guide, Command Center RX, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version CCRXKDEN20, July 2019, 19FMV3558-34
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- NDP KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., document version DirectPrintKDEN2, February 2019, 19FMV3558-34
- PP2600B 2600.2-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment B, IEEE, document version 1.0, June 2009
- CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,

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Part 1, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001

CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,  
Part 2, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002

CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,  
Part 3, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003

CC CCpart1 + CCPart2 + CCPart3

CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security  
Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004

SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-09-24, document  
version 31.0

## Appendix A            Scheme Versions

During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme and Scheme Notes have been used.

### A.1            Scheme/Quality Management System

| Version | Introduced  | Impact of changes |
|---------|-------------|-------------------|
| 1.23.2  | 2020-05-11  | None              |
| 1.23.1  | 2020-03-06  | None              |
| 1.23    | 2019-10-14  | None              |
| 1.22.3  | Application | Original version  |

### A.2            Scheme Notes

| Scheme Note | Version | Title   | Applicability   |
|-------------|---------|---|---|
| SN-15       | 3.0     | Demonstration of test coverage                  | Clarify demonstration of test coverage at EAL2: evaluator + developer tests together provide full coverage of the TSFI.                     |
| SN-18       | 1.0     | Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target | Clarifications on the content of the ST.  |
| SN-22       | 1.0     | Vulnerability Assessment                        | Vulnerability assessment needs to be redone if 30 days or more has passed between AVA and the final version of the final evaluation report. |